This article provides a reading of The Unnamable in the light of contemporary cognitive theories of self and self-consciousness. By drawing on Daniel Dennett's account of self as a 'centre of narrative gravity' and on the threelevels model of self proposed by Antonio Damasio, the article foregrounds significant analogies with Beckett's literary journey into cognition, even before and beyond The Unnamable. It concludes by arguing that a cognitive approach to his narrative work can offer a framework for interpreting the extent to which Beckett has been able to explore the mind, generating through language and narrative devices experiences which sciences can only discursively report.
Introduction: A Cognitive Journey
It is fairly odd discovering, in a letter to Georges Duthuit at the very beginning of June 1949 -only two months after having started to draft The Unnamable, in one of the gloomiest periods of his creative careerthat Beckett was "reading Around the World in 80 Days," positively classified as "lively stuff" (LSB II, 163) . Given the descending, excavating nature of the last novel of the trilogy, it would have been less surprising to find a mention of the equally famous masterpiece by Verne, the Voyage au centre de la Terre (1864) . Yet, in a less local scrutiny, both the horizontal, superficial (and significantly circular) orbit of Phileas Fogg's enterprise, and the vertical, geologically stratified axis of Professor Lidenbrok's quest are present in Beckett's narrative work. However, these two movements are not simultaneously operative, but rather are subsequently exploited throughout Beckett's narrative trajectory. As Mark Nixon elucidates, sometime after Murphy there is a turning point in how the trope of the journey is treated in Beckett's fiction, since Beckett has accepted "that there was no 'to' or 'towards', and thus no redemptive destination" (191) . The horizontal pointless excursions of Belacqua across Irish cityscapes or Murphy's wandering in the outer world of London progressively come to an end in the trilogy -passing, as Shane Weller argues, from the "object-world or subject-world" of Murphy to the "flight from all world" in Malone meurt (Weller, 109) . This is not to say that the trope of the journey disappears from Beckett's literary imagination. Rather, as Nixon indicates, it "remains central to Beckett's postwar work, but is negated" (97) or, I would suggest, inverted (The Unnamable being "a kind of inverted spiral," (Beckett 2009, 310) ). The horizontal plane of movement is replaced by a vertical expedition, and Belacqua's "gression" (Beckett 2010, 33 ) is substituted by an inward plunge, of which The Unnamable constitutes the endless bottom. In this narrative manoeuvre, a different 'towardness' emerges, for Beckett understands, as we shall see, that the outward journey in search of the self is the "wrong figure" (qtd. in Knowlson, 247 ). An alternative exploration has to be directed on the way to what he calls the "seed of motion" (247) by going beyond what is called in Molloy "the surface leaden above the infernal depths" (Beckett 2009, 73) of the mind from which the illusion of selfhood stems.
In the present article, I want to account for this second speleological journey in Beckett's fictional work by drawing on contemporary cognitive theories of self.
